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The Cresset (Vol. XXXV, No. 8)

Valparaiso University

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June, 1972

THE CRESSET

a review of literature, the arts, and public affairs

COVER: Arlene Koerber, graduating Valparaiso University art major, *Portrait III*, oil painting, 1972. Sloan Purchase Award.

ABOVE: David Heitner, graduating Valparaiso University art major, *Frozen #1*, black and white photograph, 1972 Union Purchase Award.

THE CRESSET

June, 1972 **Vol. XXXV, No. 8**

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THE CRESSET is published monthly except July and August by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, as a forum for scholarly writing and informed opinion. The views expressed herein are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion at Valparaiso University or within the editorial board. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Subscription rates: One year — $2.00; two years — $3.75; three years — $5.50. Single copy 20 cents. Entire contents copyrighted 1972 by the Valparaiso University Press, without whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden.

In Luce Tua

By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

The Shooting of George Wallace

Governor George Wallace has been shot. At such a time the petitions in The General Prayer for "all in authority" and for "all who are in peril of death" link together with a new urgency. At this writing Wallace lies paralyzed from the waist down. No prophet can tell whether the Governor will fully recover, or what his future will hold whatever his physical condition turns out to be.

Nor can one say what certain effect the felling of Wallace will have on the up-coming Democratic convention, or on Wallace's impact come November, in the general election. 1972 is turning out to be a most surprizing political year, and the general election is fully five months distant. President Nixon, the front-runner, is at the moment in Moscow, Senator McGovern is cleaning up in the Oregon primary, Senator Humphrey is running hard for the California primary yet ahead, and all the while our deadly mines are lurking in the waterways of North Vietnam and our bombs are raining from the air. Such a state of affairs makes commentary on current issues peculiarly hazardous, as those of us who have lately been eating our words know only too well.

The future being so uncertain, the sensible thing for a columnist to do is to look to the recent past. So doing, one faces a phenomenon worth exploring: The mixed reactions so many people experienced on receiving the news of the attack on George Wallace.

This phenomenon is worth analysis partly because Wallace will, in all likelihood, survive to influence the political destiny of our country – and therefore influence our personal destinies in unforeseen ways. It is important that our heads be clear when the time comes.

Even if the assault on Wallace results in his effective removal from the American political scene, thoughtful citizens should realize that the "Wallace spirit" will persist in our midst. No politician creates his own support. Rather, every politician must find supporters by appealing to sizable constituencies in ways they approve. And Wallace has found his people. The day after his wounding, he scored impressive victories in Maryland and Michigan in spite of, or perhaps because of, everything liberal commentators had said about him over the years. While this gathering tide of voters may find no substitute leader if Wallace is incapable of pursuing his intentions this year, the Wallace sentiment will probably find a means of expression other than voting for Wallace. Thus what Wallace represents will survive the man who succeeded in shaking the eyeteeth of the American political system and bringing significant political issues to the surface.

The mixed reaction many felt at the news of the Wallace attack derives, I think, from the fact that Wallace established a number of identities in the public consciousness. He is a man – a father and husband. He is a symbol – of racism and bigotry to some, of independence and heroism to others. He is a political force – in Alabama, in the Democratic party, and increasingly in the nation. And (what is not quite the same thing) he is a plausible Presidential candidate whose near-assassination on the campaign trail called forth associations with the slain Kennedy brothers who met their death in public view.

Viewing George Wallace in the aspect of any *one* of these identities produces a *different* and *distinct* reaction. Viewing Wallace's shooting in *all* these aspects therefore produces "mixed feelings" in everyone but his ardent supporters, for he brought these various feelings about the Wallace shooting can be understood and their "mixture" accepted. Indeed, their mixture must be accepted if we are to resist confusing our feelings and judgments about Wallace with what he represents.

Wallace the Man

The Wallace shooting was an attempt by one man lawlessly to take the life of another. As such, it produced a nearly universal reaction of shock, revulsion, and fear. The shock stems, I think, from being reminded that the unexpected is as much a fact of life as is the routine and familiar which fills most of our days. One might suppose that a news-conscious nation of people would somehow lose the ability to be totally suprised by the ongoing events of history. And perhaps this has happened to some extent. The only thing more shocking than the shooting would be that such a shooting might no longer be shocking. But the evidence is persuasive that some of our number continue to find ways to astound, sadden, and scare the rest of us by their actions.

The revulsion so commonly felt at the news of the Wallace attack is perhaps due to our deep moral sense that lawless killing is evil in almost every instance, together with the general realization that the attempted killing of Wallace was no exception to this moral rule. One may be opposed to what Wallace *represents* and wish to oppose him in the ballot box, but he has done nothing whatsoever to merit maiming by a self-appointed executioner. To see this, one need only think of himself if he had been in Wallace's shoes at the Laurel shopping center. Who among us would count himself deserving of assassination had he lived George Wallace's life? Surely there is no one in his right mind who would think such a thing.

Many of us felt plain fear on hearing the news of the shooting. We knew that Wallace was perhaps the most well-guarded politician on the hustings, save the President himself. If a bullet-proof lectern and flying wedges of Alabama state troopers and Secret Service agents cannot protect a man, then which of us who have no such protection on the streets or in our homes can feel altogether safe from a sudden visitation of the senseless death that nearly befell George Wallace? The man who shot Wallace is evidently mad. But he was not known to be mad, and in fact he had recently been *certified* sane. We know the world to contain many mad men; and we know that mad-men's victims are often obscure people like ourselves and the bystanders at the Wallace rally. The person who felt a twinge of fear from the Wallace assault is in touch with a sinister reality.

Wallace the Symbol

George Wallace had come to symbolize racism and demagogy for many Americans. Other citizens obviously saw him as the "voice of the people" and their champion of "freedom of choice" for themselves. My guess is that most of the readers of these pages tended to see him in the former light, rather than the latter. So it becomes relevant to ask the difficult question: Is there any justification for taking any comfort in a setback encountered by a politician whom you think represents some of the more pernicious elements of American politics?

It might be suggested that the Christian maxim "hate the sin but love the sinner" offers sufficient guidance here. No doubt this maxim captures an important truth; that's what makes it a maxim. But the saying suggests a separation of men and their actions which in other respects is untenable. If in fact Wallace encouraged and inflamed racist sentiment in this country, then he, as well as his actions, stands under judgment, for he is responsible for his actions. And if he devalued the coinage of political rhetoric in the land, he himself should be held accountable for his words. Hatred of racism and demagogy is feckless, even insincere, when it is not accompanied by a willingness to oppose the *persons* who are racists or demagogs.

There is, of course, a question as to whether Wallace was, or is, a racist and a demagog. And even if he were these things, one could very well hope that somehow the harrowing experience he is now going through will purge him of those supposed features. My point now is only that *if* one sees Wallace as a demonic force in American politics, a feeling of "righteous comfort" at his setback is not only permissible, but also *required* for righteousness' sake. The Christian can, indeed must, love George Wallace as a man; but the Christian must *not* love him as a racist.

To which a brother might reply: "Yes, but the Christian must love *George Wallace,* irrespective of *any* of the things *he is* (man, racist, whatever)." To which the response can only be: "The statement makes no sense."

Wallace the Political Force

Whether Wallace continues in the campaign or is forced to the sidelines in order to regain his health, the several hundred delegates he has already accumulated in the primaries will be heard in the Democratic convention. Speculation now has it that either Humphrey or McGovern will forge a pact with Wallace and his supporters, perhaps ever a pact which puts Wallace on the slate in the vice-Presidential slot. More imaginative observers ever argue for a Nixon-Wallace agreement.

Whatever unfolds, however, it seems unlikely that Wallace will be able to mount the major effort required for a strong third-party run for the Presidency itself. Until his shooting, it was unclear whether Wallace was sincere in his announced intention to work within the Democratic party. Now he is restricted to working with-

in at least one of the two existing political parties; he can no longer flaunt them both and thereby threaten a major Constitutional crisis in the land.

This feature of Wallace's situation quite properly gives heart to those of us who are concerned lest factionalism disrupt the American two-party political process. As much as one might appreciate change in the political system, the sagest observers of our political processes seem to agree that the formation of new political parties is not the way of progress. Perhaps Wallace himself had come to this realization when he vowed to work within the existing party machinery to achieve his objectives. But if he did not, then the realization has been thrust upon him by his present circumstances. Believers in the two-party system can breathe a sigh of relief.

Wallace the Presidential Candidate

Perhaps the dominant response of people when they heard of the Wallace attack was simply: "Oh no! Not *another* national leader shot in the streets!" This response bespeaks a growing alarm that the country's future will become increasingly determined by bullets, rather than by ballots. This concern rightly strikes fear in the heart of every citizen. Gunmen may never rule our country, but if they determine who *does* rule we could find ourselves unable to *find* good rulers, precisely because the risk to them personally is too great.

It is small comfort on this score to be told that Arthur Bremer, like Oswald and Sirhan before him, was a crazed man. We surely produce at least one new crazed man every year in this country, and the precedent of their shooting Presidents and would-be Presidents poses a danger we cannot ignore. Inasmuch as Bremer's shooting of Wallace lends renewed impetus to that evil precedent, it merits the serious and sustained concern of each of us.

These few remarks on the shooting of Wallace will no doubt strike you as perhaps too obvious to bear public speaking. If so, I direct your attention to a statement recently made by *Newsweek's* Stewart Alsop, himself formerly no Wallace supporter:

> In an odd sort of way, the bullets that hit him have made the feisty little segregationist respectable for the first time, in the dictionary sense of the word — "worthy of respect, esteem or deference."

No, Mr. Alsop you are wrong, As a man, George Wallace is and always was worthy of respect. As a "segregationist," he will never be "worthy of respect." As a political force in a democratic society, he is no more worthy of "deference" now than he once was. And as a Presidential candidate, he and all of his fellow candidates are *automatically* to be "esteemed."

Alsop, like many of us, doubtless experienced "mixed feelings" at the news of the Wallace shooting. His statement, however, ignores his feelings. But such disingenuousness is unnecessary. If we *understand* our mixed feelings, we can *accept* them and *rely* on them when the day comes to reckon with Wallace the politician again.

On Second Thought

By ROBERT J. HOYER

Jesus said, "Your faith has made you whole." Centuries later we still argue the relationship in essentials between our faith and His power in the accomplishment of the miracle. Because we didn't listen. He did *not* say "Thanks, I needed your faith to do that miracle."

Jesus was quite specifically and deliberately denying any divine difference between Him and us in the deed. He said in effect, "*I* didn't do that. You did." The stress is on "your" not on "faith." The words are part of a long chain of statements calling us to see ourselves as doing — all the way down the line — what He did. The baptismal dedication. The words of forgiveness and the acceptance of all alike. The healing of sickness and the casting out of demons. The acceptance of guilt and the giving up of life. All the way to the cross. Even there, He denied any difference. We are to take our cross and follow Him. And in the resurrection, Paul said, He is no different from us except that He is the firstfruits. He did it first.

He is of course different, unique. He is my Lord and my God. Though He spent His years insisting that we be like Him — even, after He left us, that we together be the Body of Christ — He is unique. But His insistence still raises the question for me: Why are we so careful to protect the difference, to claim that we are not even *like* Him, that only He can do what He did?

The answer dismays me. Because we do not want to be like Him. We do not want to be dedicated as He was, we do not want to heal as He did, we do not want to take up our cross and follow Him. We do not want to give away our lives. If He did things we cannot do, then we are safe with our lesser doing. It is fear that closes my ears to His command, that I do what He did with all the power He had.

A Scrutiny of a Statement on Scripture

By WALTER E. KELLER
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When the president of a denomination moves to purge the faculty of one of its theological schools, something is obviously amiss. The current president of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Dr. J. A. O. Preus, has just done that, and the faculty of Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, Missouri, has come under a dark cloud of suspicion. Many are asking what is happening.

The press, both secular and religious, has been giving nation-wide publicity to this controversy, but such coverage in itself does not shed great light. The hubbub of voices does not merely represent a variety of responses to a single focal issue; a large part of the hubbub derives from the refusal of the conflict to be so reduced. For many, perhaps most, the dispute lies principally in a tangled snarl of questions related to constitutional matters, procedures, and church politics. For others it is a quarrel over theology, even though not all theological minds agree as to which doctrinal problem is most urgent.

For this reason it was an important signal when Dr. Preus issued "A Statement of Scriptural and Confessional Principles," distributing it to all pastors, teachers, and congregations of the denomination. This document presents Dr. Preus' judgment that the focal issue is theological rather than procedural and that the pertinent theological issue at stake is the doctrine of Scripture. The seminary faculty subsequently issued its "Response" to Dr. Preus' Statement. They assert that his Statement is invalid both as an assessment and as a solution of presumed problems at the Seminary. Those who are sympathetic to the difficulties of the Seminary faculty think that Dr. Preus may be seeking to gloss over procedural irregularities and that he may very well be mispresenting their theology.

However that may be, the Statement is offered as a set of guidelines also for theological discussion in the Synod. It may, therefore, be examined theologically in its own right, for it exhibits a theological position which by presidential invitation is to be scrutinized regardless of its merits as a profile of the Seminary faculty. It is in this rather more limited context that I shall offer some observations on Dr. Preus' Statement.

The Statement, first of all, addresses itself to six topics: I. Christ as Savior and Lord; II. Law and Gospel; III. Mission of the Church; IV. Holy Scripture; V. Original Sin; VI. Confessional Subscription. Each topic is treated in classic confessional form: a paragraph of positive affirmation, followed by a series of unacceptable inferences or negative corollaries. This form has the undoubted merit of laying bare the intention and meaning of the author and of avoiding deliberately cultivated ambiguities.

Secondly, the proportion in the treatment of the topics is significant. About two-thirds of the Statement is devoted to the topic on Holy Scripture. That is the measure of the importance attached to this doctrine. Such importance derives from a double, interrelated source. The LC-MS is the heir of a theological tradition which assigns foundational significance to the Scriptures for doctrinal and ecclesial authority. Consequently, when that foundation is threatened, or even thought to be threatened, the exterminators are called out in force against the termites, lest the whole doctrinal and ecclesial superstructure come tumbling down. This urgency is then reinforced by an historical argument. Just as the early Church fathers concentrated their theological labors on the doctrine of Christ and the Trinity, just as the Reformation fathers hammered out the doctrine of salvation and justification, so the time is ripe for the Church today to work out a viable doctrine of the Holy Scriptures.

The third observation relates to the sequence of the topics. It provides a desired — and desirable — framework for formulating a doctrine of Holy Scripture. The sequence reveals a thoroughly evangelical conviction that a doctrine *about* Holy Scripture cannot be drawn up apart from, or in advance of, consideration of the teaching *in* Holy Scripture. Therefore, to look only at the sequence of topics for the moment, the Statement would seem to be offering laudable theological direction. The central Christian confession of Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord necessarily leads to an understanding of divine revelation as both Law and Gospel. This defines the Church's evangelical mission. Within this framework and under these prior rubrics we must address ourselves to the subject of Holy Scripture. Against the corrosive influence of original sin, particularly if that corrosion takes the form of denying its universal influence, we are helped by the testimony of the Lutheran Confessors.

What One Hand Gives, The Other Takes Away

In the fourth place, however, we must also draw attention to the great irony of the Statement. What it appears to give with one hand it withdraws with the other, for it abandons its own frame of reference as it begins to unfold its theology of Holy Scripture. That becomes partially apparent in some of the positive affirmations, and altogether obvious in its negative antitheses. As a

result the reader may be in full agreement that the doctrine of Holy Scripture holds top priority on today's theological agenda, and that the indicated framework is the evangelically proper one for its formulation. At the same time, however, he may be out of sympathy with the proposed terms in their more detailed outline. In order to show this inner contradiction in the Statement, it will be necessary to take a sample thesis on Holy Scripture, and subject it to a careful analysis, even at the risk of what may appear to be mere theological quibbling.

Of the nine theses on the topic of Holy Scripture the second one addresses itself to "The Purpose of Scripture." Its positive affirmation states:

> "We believe (1a) that all Scripture bears witness to Jesus Christ and (1b) that its *primary* purpose is to make men wise unto salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. (2) We therefore affirm that the Scriptures are rightly used *only* when they are read from the perspective of justification by faith and the proper distinction between Law and Gospel. (3a) Since the saving work of Jesus Christ was accomplished through His personal entrance into our history and His genuinely historical life, death, and resurrection, (3b) we acknowledge that the recognition of the soteriological purpose of Scripture in no sense permits us to call into question or deny the historicity or factuality of matters recorded in the Bible." (The numbering of the sentences has been added to facilitate further reference, and the italics add emphasis for our analytical purposes.)

We may note that this thesis initially observes the general framework that has been suggested by the sequence of the major topics. It begins with a declaration of the central content of the Scriptural witness (1a). To that Christian confession it adds a corollary statement regarding the purpose of Scripture (1b). From that twin premise it draws a conclusion about the right use of the Scriptures (2), corresponding to the framework suggested by the sequence of major topics. This attitude is reinforced by reaffirming the soteriological (saving) purpose in 3b. The saving events are declared to be genuinely historical (3a). Then there follows as a matter of logical consequence the proscription in 3b.

The inner tension of this thesis is already apparent. The *primary* purpose (1b) implies also a secondary purpose. When this multiple, ranked purpose is translated into a corresponding use, however, *only* a single right use is allowed. The condition for the right use of Scripture is not by the Reformation perspective of justification by faith. In traditional Lutheran language that means observing the distinction between the Law and the Gospel. Consequently, the only right use may be understood as a searching of the Scripture to find in it the Gospel, namely, the historical life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ for me. To this use the Law is contributory in that it enables me to appropriate and understand the Gospel properly. Conceivably, therefore, the declaration on purpose intends to say that the *primary* purpose of Scripture is as a proclamation of the Gospel, while its implied secondary purpose is as an instruction in the work of the Law.

That, however, is not the intention of the declaration on the multiple, ranked purpose of the Scripture. What is termed the historicity or factuality of the Biblical witness is at issue in the implied secondary purpose (3b). The Statement expressly rejects the view which holds "that recognition of the primary purpose of Scripture makes it irrelevant whether such questions of fact as the following are answered in the affirmative: Were Adam and Eve real historical individuals? Did Israel cross the Red Sea on dry land? Did the brazen serpent miracle actually take place? Was Jesus really born of a virgin? Did Jesus perform all the miracles attributed to him? Did Jesus' resurrection actually involve the return to life of His dead body?"

We must note that this rejection converts into at least three positive affirmations: first, that these incidents are all matters of fact; second, that they must be acknowledged as such; and third, that such an acknowledgement bears some unstated relevance. Hence, the implied secondary purpose of Scripture is to impart facts, necessarily historical and somehow relevant. This secondary purpose is, moreover, independent of the primary purpose, neither derived from it nor influenced by it.

Hidden Inversion without Lutheran Insight

The inner tension now becomes quite unbearable, for the *only* right use of a double-purposed Scripture is declared to be that governed by the perspective of justification by faith. Does this then mean that justification includes more than God's pardon of a sinner? That to continuing divine forgiveness, freely and graciously given for Christ's sake, there is tied a whole package of prescriptions as to what must necessarily constitute matters of past historical fact? Does this mean that faith is more than trust in the divine-human Savior? That in addition to joyful dependence and reliance upon Him and His mediatorial work there is the further obligation to swear certainty in historical matters that have latterly become problematic? Am I really expected to hold that my salvation through Jesus Christ is somehow related to, perhaps even dependent upon, an unequivocal assertion that once there really was salvation through a brazen serpent for the Israelites in the wilderness?

If these things are so, then the historicity and factuality of all matters recorded in the Bible as a necessary tenet of faith antecedes any subsequent distinction between Law and Gospel. Then there are actually two, independent right uses of the Scriptures, one which takes a perspective of justification by faith, the other which reads the whole Bible as a necessarily literal record of past events. A great contradiction then lies in the hidden inversion that has taken place. The primary purpose has been devoted to a place of secondary importance

while the alleged secondary purpose has actually emerged as the dominant one. The Statement's sequence of topics seemed to promise a discussion of the Holy Scriptures in an evangelical framework; instead an *a priori* prescription regarding the historicity of biblical records, untouched by the Lutheran insight into the distinction between the Law and Gospel, is offered instead.

It would be foolish, of course, to maintain that by observing the proper distinction between Law and Gospel one could solve all biblical problems. That is certainly not the case in questions regarding the historicity of any given event. But, as we have observed, the question is not simply whether, say, Adam and Eve were real historical individuals. The Statement regards the answer to that question a foregone conclusion; yes, of course they were!

There is another, prior claim that is being made. Adam and Eve *must* be affirmed to have been real historical individuals, in the same way in which the resurrection of Jesus *must* be affirmed to have actually happened. Such a claim invites the question, "Why must they be affirmed?" The negative antithesis implies the assertion: It is relevant to say yes to the historicity of both Adam and Eve and the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. It fails to answer the crying question, "Relevant to what?"

Although the Statement nowhere gives a direct reply to that question, those who are familiar with the piety of the LC-MS are well acquainted with the unstated syllogism on which that insistence rests. The Scripture is the Word of God; the Word of God is true; therefore the Scripture is true. Upon that foundation the house of faith may be built with every assurance and certainty. Hence, any suspicion of error in the Scripture is not only a slander against God, but an attack upon faith's certainty. Consequently, whatever the Bible says *must* be true.

There is a notable blind spot in this piety. It seemingly fails to reckon with the possibility that God's inscriptured Word may well take form in non-literal literary genres. In teaching the Word of God Jesus Himself used non-literal parables; think of the story of the Prodigal Son, for example. He used exaggerated images for heightened effect; think of a log in a man's eye! Yet the wondrous mystery of God's creating man and man's creaturely dependence upon His creator is somehow thought to be impaired by a non-literal reading of Genesis I, and God's veracity impugned by a miraculous heightening of the oft-recounted story of the Exodus from Egypt! Literary, historical, comparative religious indicators to the contrary, this piety insists that Adam and Eve *must* be accepted as literal transcriptions.

In the larger context of this kind of theology and piety the Lutheran distinction between the Law and the Gospel can make a valuable contribution to a modern doctrine of Holy Scripture, and more particularly to the discussion of the historicity of the events recorded in the Bible. Law and Gospel cannot decide whether an event is historical; it does however sound a caveat at any *a priori* insistence upon what *must* be regarded as historical. It does so by continually raising the question: Must a narrative be historical for purposes of the Law or of the Gospel? To exemplify this point we might profitably address this question both to the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and to the story of Adam and Eve.

Must the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead be regarded as an historical event? Must it really have happened? We may note that the early Christians proclaimed it as an event, and that St. Paul called upon eye witnesses other than himself who had seen the Risen Lord. It is preached as the culmination of God's saving work for us men and our salvation in Christ, and as the inauguration of the new age of His work through His Spirit. This may not suffice for the skeptic who persists in asking whether Jesus really rose from the dead, but then neither will the most extravagant claims for Scriptural infallibility. Nor will the proper distinction between Law and Gospel decide whether He rose. What can be said however is that Jesus' resurrection *must* have happened for purposes of the Gospel. The New Testament specifically says that if Christ is not risen, our faith is vain by reason of our continuing existence in sin. There is no Gospel, no saving work of God, if Christ is not risen, for Jesus' resurrection is the Gospel.

Every Man an Adam, and Christ for Each One

Must Adam and Eve be regarded as real historical individuals? Or, to include a concern expressed elsewhere in the Statement, must the fall of Adam and Eve be regarded as a real historical event? We may note that the story of Genesis 1-3 is scarcely mentioned and plays no significant role in the rest of the Old Testament. The same is true of the Gospels in the New Testament, although there are some important references to Adam in Paul's letters. We may note further that the Adam and Eve story lends itself quite readily to a kind of parabolic interpretation, which imparts particularly penetrating insight into the human situation. It is often regarded as a storied summary of the dynamics at work in the human race everywhere, the truth of which is independent of whether of not there actually lived an historical Adam and Eve.

This parabolic view may not suffice for the biblical literalist who claims not only that there really was a primal set of parents who actually fell, but also insists that there *must* have been such wayward parents. No Law and Gospel distinction will decide whether Adam and Eve are historical persons. But that distinction will resist the erroneous notion that a literal Adam must be affirmed for the sake of the Gospel. Even when St. Paul draws a parallel between Adam and Christ, he does so for the sake of calling attention to the new life Christ brings to a race of culpable men caught in sin and death.

Meantime, God continues to create man; men continue to rebel, and God continues to execute His sentence of death, regardless of whether Adam was historical or mythological.

This in no way compromises the character of Holy Scripture as the Word of God. That Word elevates the Gospel to the rank of the one thing needful. That Word declares Jesus Christ and his historical life, death, and resurrection to be constitutive of the Gospel. The Scriptures know of no final saving work of God other than that Christ died for our sins and was raised again for our justification. Adam and Eve, on the other hand, do not enjoy such constitutive significance. God's work in the creation and in the Law are not tied to their historicity. They have what may be called illustrative significance. And an illustration need not be drawn from an historical event; it may be drawn in parabolic form with equal or greater impact.

Sometimes this is pejoratively labelled Gospel reductionism; evangelical theology has always been vulnerable to this charge. There is no reason to expect that a doctrine of Holy Scripture, evangelically formulated, will escape that burden as the Church today gropes toward its viable, responsible articulation. Yet in the current distress, especially in the LC-MS, it is a risk worth taking — if indeed such it be — to recall that many things can be said, many things may be said, but only one thing must be said in the name of the Gospel.

There is good authority for determining to know nothing else among men, to lay no other foundation, to preach no different Gospel, than that God gave His Son, Jesus Christ, to be crucified for us, and raised Him as the first-born from the dead. That, too, is a kind of reductionism. But it is Scriptural. And Historical.

Latin America 1972: Reform or Revolution?

By ROGER W. FONTAINE
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Sound familiar? It should. With the exception of the date you probably have read of skipped over dozens of articles on the subject — at least in the past.

Today, however, Latin America is not fashionable. By that I mean, among other things, the American Government some time ago decided that it was not the most critical area in the world (as President Kennedy once stated).

The reasons for this shift are many and no doubt complex, and I am not interested in detailing them. But I suspect Vietnam, the taming of Cuba, and the apparent failure of the Alliance for Progress — that ten year aid program which was to change fundamentally Latin America's "creaking" social, economic and political structures — are a major part of the explanation.

But, to state the obvious, Latin America is still there, considerably larger in population if not in problems, and the question remains — how is the region doing, and what went wrong? *Did something go wrong?*

Let us consider the last first. And the answer is it depends. That equivocation in turn depends on which set of standards you wish to judge the last decade.

Let's begin with the ones that the Kennedy Administration put forth in 1961. According to its best thinkers, Latin America, after a period of neglect by us, was approaching a critical decade. Owing to the sudden spurt in expectations of its impoverished millions major changes had to be made or social revolution would sweep the area. Furthermore those revolutions would not only be anti-American, but also undemocratic. In brief, one by one, the Latin republics would go communist. Interestingly enough both Cuban and American analysts agreed on this point.

Therefore, according to the American prescription, those regimes that were controlled by oligarchies or their military allies must surrender their power via elections to political parties who were popular and bent on rapid albeit peaceful reform.

But, the argument continued, these social reforms (principally of the tax and land tenure structure) plus large development projects (power, transportation) could not be financed by Latin America alone. Therefore, the United States (and hopefully other developed nations) must step in with the critical capital that would make a take-off into sustained economic growth possible. And that would (at least eventually) bring about political stability.

Cost: two billion dollars a year.

The scenario did not work out as planned. In the first place, the American aid package never met the target amount. (That magic figure by the way was supposed to be the *total* amount of fresh foreign capital: private investment and international agency loans as well as U.S. public funds.)

Government aid came through the pipeline at a slower rate than expected, and private investment dropped in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution.

On the Latin American side, democracy itself made no great gains. Militaries now are in charge of the two largest countries in South America, Brazil and Argentina

(they weren't in 1961), and they also rule directly in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Furthermore such bastions of democracy as Chile and Uruguay are trembling on the brink of social chaos. Also hopes for Columbia (once a showcase for the Alliance) have dimmed in the last five years. Only Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela are in good political shape, but they were ten years ago too.

In Haiti Doctor Duvalier has left the scene, but his son Jean Claude runs the country — with the help of his numerous relatives. The Somozas remain in charge of Nicaragua, General Lopez is *de facto* president of Honduras, and General Torrijos performs a similar role in Panama. And so it goes.

In fact it could be argued that the only significant political change for the better in Latin America is the assassination of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and the banishment of his family from the Dominican Republic. However, there is no need in highlighting the country's recent history since it gained a considerable amount of publicity on its own in the spring of 1965.

Economically, most countries did not match much less exceed the projected (and modest) growth rate of 2.5% per year. In fact, many had slower rates of growth than in the previous decade. And in the meantime none except perhaps Peru has significantly diversified its exports. Most still depend on one product, for example, petroleum (Venezuela), copper (Chile), coffee (Brazil and El Salvador). Furthermore, because of the increased amount of loans received, the foreign debt for the republics has risen alarmingly. Admittedly the whole economic picture is not bleak. Brazil since 1966 has posted growth rates of 7-10%, and Mexico continued its 6-8% through the decade.

What of the social reforms? Some legislation was passed though it took years of politicking to do it. Administration of those reforms may well be another matter. Thus no country has carried out completely a land reform program. Few have made even a substantial beginning, and those who are willing can't quite seem to decide how to go about it. (Unfortunately, there are about as many different schemes to choose from as there are republics to try them in.)

All of this may sound like a decade horribly misspent, and at this point, it is tempting to pass judgment and perhaps call for another effort. But I won't do that. A new effort won't be any more successful than the last no matter how the United States will try. This is an important point, because I would argue that the Alliance's failure was not caused by a failure in American committment.

Thus I am suggesting that some basic assumptions made about Latin America by the Kennedy Administration were wrong. In general, we expected too much because we knew too little of the region. This was not a simple matter of neglecting book work — the expertise did not exist yet. But now after ten years we have learned some things that can explain in part the failure to achieve the goals set out by John Kennedy.

Today after a Decade of Wrong Assumptions

What have we learned? First, Latin America did not possess political, social and economic institutions on the point of collapse. They proved a lot tougher than anyone had expected. It seemed most Latin Americans liked (or at least acquiesced to) what they already had. Few were willing to leap into the unknown despite our warmest encouragement to do so. And they were probably right.

Second, Latin America was not the network of oligarchy-run banana republics we had imagined. In the bigger countries, they had long shared or surrendered their power to urban middle class elements. Power, in fact, was distributed in a crazy quilt pattern that made responsibility almost impossible to locate. To switch the metaphor, the political machinery seemed a complicated but balanced mechanism which working at full capacity produced nothing or nearly nothing. It was not a simple matter of a small clique saying no to the masses. It was a complex matter of many cliques trying to outshout the others.

Third, the militaries were not after all mere props of the landed elite. Many officers came from urban, middle class families with no ties with the oligarchy. Furthermore, these same officers articulated views on national issues that did not square with the status quo beliefs they were supposed to have.

When this was discovered, American officials began to be more tolerant of military rule — direct or indirect. The Rockefeller Report reflects this shift in attitude most clearly. And it was drawn largely from academic research.

Recently, however, feelings about the armed forces have undergone another change — at least in scholarly circles. The new argument states that while officers are predominantly urban and middle class, it is a mistake to assume that this is the major variable shaping their political beliefs and behavior. The prime factor is the officers determination to preserve and if possible expand the military corporate self interest in the form, for example, of larger defense budgets in order to finance larger pension plans. Reform comes next if at all. As evidence, rather dramatic low correlations between military rule and economic and social change are cited. And a further argument also states that there is nothing in an officer's training which makes him a better manager of resources than civilians. The latter point is still open for debate, but American policy has not yet caught up with this latest wrinkle nor has it worked out a satisfactory formula in dealing with the new style ultranationalist military regimes that run Peru, Panama, and briefly Bolivia.

Fourth, the assumption that a large and influentail body of civilians were waiting with well developed programs of reform proved erroneous. In most cases aside from good intentions, plans did not exist much less detailed individual projects. Furthermore the other assumption that pro-reform sentiment was widespread and well organized in the form of democratic leftist parties proved illusory too. While it was true that they existed and that in some cases they polled large numbers of votes in one and sometimes two elections (P.R.D. in the Dominican Republic, the Christian Democrats in Chile, *Accion Democratica* in Venezuela) they did not have staying power. They either splintered into factions (Chile's Christian Democrats) or disappeared after a coup (Peru's *Alianza Popular*) or dramatically reversed themselves on key political issues (Peru's *APRA*).

Their ephemerality proved very embarrassing, but it was not entirely unpredictable. In view of Latin American social psychology such earlier hopes were naive. Specifically, I am referring to the high amount of distrust that pervades Latin America. No one really is willing to place confidence in anyone outside the family circle and that kind of thing makes durable organizations of unrelated individuals nearly impossible.

Fifth, the poor, especially those packed into urban slums did not revolt as expected, and show little sign of it at least in the near future. This is an important point and is worth examining in detail. According to the Alliance strategists, Latin America was perilously close to social revolution by 1960.

Why? First, they observed that the region's birth rate was 2.5% or more. Second, the problem was compounded by a rapid rate urban migration. Millions of rural poor apparently were pouring into the cities and swelling their populations an additional 5-6% per year. Slum areas grew like mushrooms (in Chile they are called *callampas,* literally mushrooms), and it seemed only a matter of time before this collective, concentrated misery would explode.

This analysis proved at least premature. One problem was observers were not working with actual evidence, but were making what seemed to be a plausible assumption, namely, extreme poverty causes revolt.

The Prospects of the Poor

Recent research, however, has uncovered a more complicated phenomenon. In the first place, the notion that the recent arrival, torn from his traditional way of life, and incapable of adjusting to the impersonal way of urban life would express his alienation through violence proved false. Most arrivals were not leaving a secure, tightly structured home life. Secondly, their arrival to the city was prepared for by earlier visits, and their immediate needs taken care of by urban friends and relatives. In addition, new migrants reported finding jobs within a few days in a survey of Latin American cities. Finally, the recent arrival in most cases reports that despite appearances his life is an improvement over his former existence. And in addition most report high amount of optimism regarding their future and their children's future.

But what of the second generation poor? They would have no memory of the bad old past. Won't they experience frustration over their lot and eventually participate in revolutionary political action?

There is no final answer to that, but again the limited evidence available is suggestive. First, the notion that such people have experienced a revolution in expectations, that is, they want far more than is possible to obtain in the near future seems doubtful. People apparently are realistic about their prospects.Thus typically most expect to improve their lot in life though their ambitions are on a modest scale. And again it has been found (in Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo) that the second generation does succeed in rising a notch or two. Again typically the father will be unskilled (ice cream vendor) and the son will acquire a modest skill and find a factory employment (automobile assemblyman).

Other factors too have limited the urban poor's political potential. First, although they may be unhappy with their lives, they do not blame their present lot on the government much less the socio-economic structure of their country. These are obviously abstract notions that intellectuals may understand, but they are mistaken to assume everyone has acquired a smattering of sociology.

Then too there is the phenomenon of "inappropriate response." Very simply, even if people are dissatisfied and perhaps blame the government they may not follow up with political action. Other possible responses are withdrawal and apathy, alcoholism, crime and so on.

What the evidence suggests so far is that while social revolution can happen it will not be directed by the urban poor. In fact, in the midst of a revolution (as was the case in Cuba) the poor will stay out of it.

And while we are on the subject, what happened to the highly publicized guerrilla movements of the 1960's? Without exception they all failed. Some like the Bolivian and Peruvian effort were quickly put down. In Guatamala and Venezuela guerrilla activity continued for a number of years, but in neither country did the revolutionaries seriously threaten the established order.

A new revolutionary phenomenon, however, took its place: the urban guerrilla. In Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay they have carried out successful kidnappings, bank robberies, and police killings. These bands staffed mostly by middle class students and dropouts may well continue low level terrorist activity, but no urban terrorist group has yet won a revolution. In the meantime the Brazilian guerrilla apparatus has been pretty well smashed.

One effect of this counter-revolutionary crusade has

been a cutting back of Cuban (meaning Fidel Castro) support for revolution. Since 1967 the Cubans have concentrated on domestic problems of which there are many. Principally, the industrialization program failed, agricultural production has declined, and sugar still remains the country's leading product. It is responsible for 80% of the exports and 28% of the National Income. Furthermore sugar prices for nearly a decade have been no higher than four cents a pound.

Nevertheless, since 1964 Fidel Castro ordered his countrymen to maximize sugar production and set a target of ten million tons to be harvested in 1970. Despite heroic efforts, 8.5 million were harvested (in itself a record), but that effort severely dislocated other sectors of the economy. Food crops were neglected, transportation facilities snarled up, "volunteer" cane cutters overworked and thus neglectful of their regular jobs.

In the wake of this, Fidel Castro made a remarkable speech which acknowledged the failures of the Revolution with remarkable candor. And quite uniquely he blamed himself for some of the mistakes. And he added if the Revolution demanded it, he would be happy to resign (It didn't).

Cuba and the Communist Consciousness

Today, Cuba lurches along on a Soviet subsidy. Cuba imports all of its fuel, and large part of its food (it once was self-sufficient) and consumer goods in exchange for two million tons of sugar and an increasingly large foreign debt. Most goods are strictly rationed (even sugar), and today there is little talk of even eventual abundance. The code phrase for continued poverty is: communist consciousness does not require material incentives.

On the other hand, matters will probably not get much worse, and the Soviets show no sign of reducing their $500 million annual subsidy. In fact since 1968 Fidel Castro has become a dependable ally — he refused, for example, to criticize the invasion of Czechoslovakia. A major reason for this is that the Soviet aid package is carefully drawn up to prevent complete collapse, but not ample enough to make Cuba eventually self-sufficient.

Is it time for the United States to negotiate a new understanding with the Castro regime as has been suggested recently? Basically I think most of the talk is wishful thinking. So far Fidel Castro has been emphatic about the undeviating and dangerous nature of imperialism. Furthermore, it seems to me after reading most of his speeches, Fidel Castro's obsession with this country will not and cannot change no matter what the United States says or does.

A word about Chile. As even Albanian intelligence knows by now, a Marxist regime has come to power via the ballot box. Actually, the new government is a shaky coalition of Socialists, Communists and splinters from the Christian Democrats and Radicals (in name only) all led by (medical) Doctor Salvador Allende.

How is he doing? In two years he has engineered a near economic collapse. Inflation is headed for a record high and so is unemployment. In addition, manufacturing has declined and food production is dropping even more rapidly. In fact, the whole ugly situation is a near carbon copy of Cuba in the early 1960's.

Politically, however, there are differences. The opposition is still legal, and fighting back. In two recent by-elections Christian Democrats won in former strongholds of government support. Presidential elections, however, are still four years away, and within the Marxist coalition are increasingly strident demands to do away with Chile's political institutions. In this superheated atmosphere civil war is not unlikely.

What about the military? Allende has made serious blunders in economic policy, and some mistakes in political maneuvering, but he has been successful in keeping on good terms with most of the officer corps, and he could well hold them off short of a complete collapse of internal order. It might be added that in this century the Chilean armed forces have never deposed a President for his political program. The single move in 1924 was directed at the Congress who opposed President Allesandri's reform package.

Could Allende turn to the Soviet Union for help and thus follow Fidel Castro? He could — if the Soviets were willing to sponsor another large aid program. The conventional wisdom argues the Soviets won't do any such thing, but I am not so sure. Problems would remain of course. In the first place the shipping distances are even greater than with Cuba, and unless they chose the Pacific route, the Russians must somehow get through the Panama Canal. That would provide an interesting problem for tomorrow's armchair strategists. Not only would the United States, the Soviet Union and Chile be involved, but so would Panama now headed by a self-labelled left wing and nationalistic general.

Finally, much of the disappointment that has been expressed regarding Latin America can be traced to the feeling that somehow for them to be successful they must resemble us. In fact my suspicion is that a good number of Latin American countries (assuming the best) will eventually resemble France or Italy rather than the United States. While this may not please many, Italian politics, for example, though hardly placid does possess the solid virtues of liberty within some kind of order.

To See Ourselves as Others See Us

By RICHARD LEE

The reader will forgive me if I review one of my favorite out-of-the-way "little magazines" in my last mass media column. Next fall I'll be on research leave from Valparaiso University and I must pass on this column and the general editorship of the *Cresset* to a new editor.

In recent years it was my happy husbandry to house a couple shoe boxes in the corner of my study. They are the *Cresset* "editorial office." A job printer down the street is our "publishing house." Each month I made my rounds begging bits of the-world-as-they-saw-it from my fellow editors and our contributors and put them into print for our friends. Those days of mendicant journalism are now some of my "good old days," and I shall miss them more than I know how to say.

Last December the publisher and my fellow editors asked me to prepare a report before I left so a new general editor's beginning would not be blind. A part of that report includes a digest of the March issue questionnaires returned from our readers.

I must admit I was a little leery of those questionnaires. As any editor knows, more readers write when they must protest than when they are pleased — and every editor has his favorite anonymous correspondents. I shall especially miss the "St. Louis Stapler" who once returned his copy shut with sixty to seventy staples. And then there was the "Minneapolis Magic Marker" who sometimes returned his copy with his delightfully testy opinions in broad strokes of black and blue felt tips over the offending print. Another favorite, about three years ago, was a letter filled with villifications and signed "Yours in Christ, Anonymous."

Imagine how pleasant it was, then, when the replies to the questionnaire were overwhelmingly favorable to the *Cresset.* Indeed, some of the praise was embarrassing and not to be believed.

On the chance that some readers, too, would like to hear what the questionnaires said I shall try to summarize nearly two hundred replies. The journal is most often liked for its frankness, scope, topicality, brevity, variety of writing styles, and — more intangibly — for its "tone," "depth," "perspective," "feel," "morality," and "personality."It is especially liked for the variety of subject matters reviewed and, with exceptions, for its wide range of opinions. (Interestingly, the journal was "charged" with being "right-wing," "left-wing" and, I interpret, mugwump. I am left with the impression that our public affairs editors must be doing something right.)

There were, of course, dissents from the majority opinion. For example, our "Christian bias" which warms many readers, puts others off. The same journal some readers called a "monthly Christian witness to my mind" and even "a voice crying in the wilderness" was just so much "drab ecclesiasticism" and "inhibiting piety" to others. One reader writes "the uninformed would never guess that your publication comes from a religious institution," and another chides us for being "too conscious of your sectarian affiliation." One respondent, apparently not a close reader, objects strenuously to "social gospel" in the journal, while another complains "the *Cresset* apparently thinks the gospel is the doctrine of original sin."

In other areas, too, an almost equal number of replies could be set side by side, for or against some perceived trait. One reader likes its "forthrightness — I know where the writer stands," and another dislikes its "personal ax-grinding." One reader finds the journal "frivolous," another "much too solemn." One reader likes "the articles which surprise [which] I wouldn't read elsewhere," and another objects to "the occasional esoteric articles." One reader scores "modernity" in the *Cresset;* another urges it to hasten "into the twentieth century." And so on.

I even have at hand a reply from a reader who likes the *Cresset* solely because "there's not so much sex," and another which objects to "its general tone of prudery." While I'm on odd responses, I should mention that there was a telephoned request for "a nude centerfold of the editor (click!)." Obviously a wrong number.

Strange to say, the content of the *Cresset* was rarely likened to other "little magazines." It was, however, likened to other journals from the *New Yorker* and *Saturday Review* to *Mad,* from the old *Reporter* and the *New Republic* to *Our Weekly Reader,* from the *Christian Century* and *Christianity Today* to *Der Nordische Aufseher,* circa 1760. Many simply said the *Cresset* was like "?" or "incomparable" or "like nothing else I read," all of which require interpretation.

Most of the criticism was severe enough to be helpful, and very little of it was merely crabbed. Readers pointed to our "stodgy" and "artless" make-up, to feature articles "too academic and specialized" for a general reader, outdated and irrelevant book reviews, the dearth of women writers, columnists on "ego-trips" and columns which merely "muse and amuse," "devotional writing in which logic lapses," poor proofing and print quality, and our other faults too numerous to mention. Here and there were replies with critiques for individual columnists, often followed with topics the reader would like to see the same columnist treat. (This columnist has been called both a "moron" and a "genius." The truth, I interpret, lies somewhere in between.)

An Interim Report to Our Readers

It is astonishing the number (nearly 60%) of the respondents who read the journal from cover to cover. Some readers felt they had come to know certain columnists "personally." That is a sobering thought when one considers that a columnist writes up about 1% of what's on his heart and mind a month. I was, however, forewarned that print is taken for personality about a year ago when a reader ventured some psychoanalysis of the editor. "You must be skitzie [*sic*] to agree with everything in this thing," she wrote. The answer, of course, is that no editor, trying to be fair, ever personally agrees with everything he prints.

The roster of recommended writers for the *Cresset* numbers nearly fifty names. Some are beyond our budget (we pay nothing, save manuscript preparation expenses), and a few readers have a most rosy notion of what 18¢ a copy buys these days. However, since March we have already published three of the recommended writers, and many of the rest are well worth tempting into print with the coin of the questionnaire requests themselves.

Certainly my gratitude goes out to those readers who gave us the courtesy of their thoughts and feelings in the questionnaires and helped me prepare my report to the publisher. He may well find that not all the recommendations can be accomodated and not all the criticisms can be corrected. One presides over a "little magazine" like the *Cresset* in the light of its own traditions and purposes, within the limitations of its resources, and with the help of steady friends every month

See-ing

On Tubes and Turntables: Th

A couple of months ago in this journal the Editor-at-Large confessed that he has never owned a car, which makes him obviously some kind of nut.

The essence of his column was that a car constitutes a great expense for a family, that it eats up money you could use for other more interesting and valuable experiences. You do have to get around, but a surprising amount of getting around can be done healthfully on foot, supplemented by the occasional taxi, bus, train, plane, ocean liner, and thumb.

The galling thing about the whole piece was the distinct impression it left — namely, that the Strietelmeier family has actually been enjoying life without a GTO or Gremlin, and that the style of life they lead is based on rational decision about what is desirable rather than on what the neighbors and the newspaper ads demand. Their objection to the autobeast is strictly on personal and practical grounds. No abstract philosophizing or universal moralizing.

Now obviously this is all a put-on. We know that a family in an Indiana small town in the 1950s and 1960s cannot have enjoyed life without a car. People in Manhattan could, but this is only because all large cities in America during those prosperous postwar years provided swift, clean, inexpensive monorails, metro systems, and municipal coaches for the convenience of citizens. John has to be kidding us with this talk about his carless, care-less years.

Still, I think I have some sense of how he feels. This life style involving rational choices, the deliberate weighing of pros and cons, the calm refusal to elevate one's own personal taste into a universal ethical standard — it all has a certain appeal, even though it blatantly violates fundamental American traditions.

So I may as well confess my own subversive temptation along this line, now that John has bared his secret. The awful truth is that although I make my living teaching English — which is to say verbal communication — I do not own the major medium of verbal communication in our culture, a television set. Even worse: Despite the fact that I am daily involved in teaching and advising under-graduates (and am therefore rightly expected to know something about their culture, values, and gods), I do not possess a stereo set or record player of any kind.

Pop music is the deity of youth, and I do not have even nominal membership in the church.

It is a spiritual defect in me, but like John with his vehicular heresy I feel oddly unregenerate. I do not harbor any noble aesthetic opposition to TV or stand morally indignant at the hours and dollars spent on records by young people. There are, after all, plenty of worse things to do, such as reading Wittgenstein or Ayn Rand, and without the commercial viability of TV

and the occasional contributions of those who welcome the forum for their views. The readership for such a journal finds it as much as it finds them, and I am grateful to those readers who have found the *Cresset,* warts and all, worth loyalty. One can say of it, as Daniel Webster said of Dartmouth College, "she is a small thing, but there are those who love her!"

In *fine,* I must note in this report to the readers that my research leave has become a good occasion for the publisher to decide afresh whether he wishes to continue publishing the *Cresset.* The continuity of the journal happily does not depend on any one editor, but at a time of change in the editorship the whole journal is wholesomely brought up for review. This is especially meet and right at a time when church and educational institutions must closely comb their auxilliary activities and count the cost.

The publisher now has on his desk rationales to discontinue the *Cresset,* continue it with certain reformations, or discontinue it and publish one of several attractive other publications. At this writing no decision has been taken in the matter. Our subscribers will be appropriately notified of the outcome of the deliberations.

On my hope there may be a new *Cresset* next fall, I am now putting two bucks in one of these shoe boxes to begin my own subscription. The new editor would surely have everything he could wish: an agreeable publisher, aimiable fellow editors, and wonderful readers. I am sure he, too, would remember the days with these shoe boxes in his study as days good beyond measure.



By CHARLES VANDERSEE

...venience of Resistance

and rock music there would be no giant corporations like RCA able buy up and preserve the nice little book publishers that mean so much to me.

However, the real thrust of my confession is this: I don't believe that I miss much by excluding picture tubes, turntables, speakers, LPs, record brushes, and all the other related stuff from my inventory of possessions.

A defective upbringing has provided me with no taste for Sunday afternoon football. A passion for automobile travel (ah there, John!) puts me in enough motel rooms in summer to catch random reruns of *All in the Family.* A profusion of desirable local concerts, films, and whatnot make it impossible to catch every weekly installment of *The Forsyte Saga* or *The Leatherstocking Tales,* and I hate to see only bits of something. Besides Walter Cronkite and Dick Cavett (whose wars, plane crashes, and late night guests are the same summer and winter), what else is there worth watching as the world turns? The upstairs neighbors know my tastes as well as I do, and when they summon me for something on the tube not-to-be-missed, there's always the bonus of an exotic drink or dessert.

As for pop music, we have an excellent FM station owned by the university and run with low-keyed flair by students. I find I prefer the random but wide sampling of current music on the after-midnight show to any attempt I might make at building a comprehensive collection. And classical music occupies the evening hours — lovingly programmed and well annotated. (Once you have found a good restaurant, you look forward to the *plat du jour* of the chef, no matter what it is.)

Best of all, the local coffeehouse is an extremely active place three nights a week, where some very competent performers run through their own versions of whatever happens to be on the latest LP from Judy Collins, Stephen Stills, or Joni Mitchell. Not to mention old folk classics and plenty of good original material.

Yet it obviously constitutes a gigantic delusion — this doing without television and records simply because it's more convenient that way, and life seems more manageable and sociable. I don't know what inspires this absurd belief that I have the best of available worlds — unless it's the fact that thinking about the infinite choices to make among tuners, amplifiers, and speakers, not to mention record labels and orchestras, gives me Excedrin Headache Number 33 1/3.

But this too may pass. Taxis disappear, and man embraces the auto like some long-lost relative. No doubt the FCC will feel impelled one of these days to ban noncommercial FM stations, while at the same time the FBI is shutting down the last of the coffeehouses. But I will have succumbed to the Zeitgeist, and with my wall-size TV in every room and a cassette player on every bookshelf, it won't matter. Except in occasional nostalgic twinges, recalling that right now these are the good old days.

The Humanity of the Divine

By STANLEY HAUERWAS
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Christ, the *Lord* of creation,
Reconciler of the world to the Father,
Redeemer of sinful humanity,
Victor over death
through his crucifixion and resurrection,
Foretaste and *Herald* of the Kingdom of God,
Incarnation **of God, very God and very man.**

Even though such affirmations about Jesus have been the center of the church's preaching from its beginning, such Christological commitments to him have not had a prominent place in much modern preaching.

This has been true in the middle class church because it requires its preaching in the form of easily palatable moralisms about how to get through life without being disturbed by it or him. This has also been true for the contemporary college chapel because such language about Jesus is awkward to the ears of those who pride themselves on being secular men. These are those who believe their virtue depends upon being different from "crude" believers and some sort of virtue attaches to what secular men are able to disbelieve.

A great deal of preaching in the college chapel attempts to meet this situation by engaging in very clever apologetics to transform our unbelief into belief. But too often such preaching ends up declaring that our doubts are faith and that our little concerns are as good as believing in Jesus. In such a setting we are told to cherish our uncertainties because they are surely signs that we are among the blessed.

In choosing to talk directly about Jesus Christ, as very God and very man, I am quite consciously rejecting this style of preaching. I do this, first, because I find calling unbelief belief intellectually unintelligible and something of a bore. The shallowness of modern unbelief is exceeded only by the shallowness of modern belief. By giving us such petty unbelievers as critics, God is judging the pettiness of our own belief.

The feeble force of modern unbelief is not to be found in a profound rejection of God crucified on a cross. Rather it is embodied in the shrug of the shoulders that says it simply does not make a whit of difference whether one believes or not. As Christians we have no response to this because we have reduced the significance and depth of Christian belief not only for ourselves but also for the unbeliever.

Secondly, I reject this form of preaching, this glorification of unbelief, because it is but a form of pietism as spiritually vacuous as the pietism of belief. Both pietisms are preoccupied with the self and its little doubts or its little conversions. What a lost people we must be to think that God really gives a damn whether we believe in him or not! The pietism of unbelief and belief are both attempts to reduce God to our criterion of significance. In the light of God's action in Christ, this preoccupation with self is insignificant; in theological terms, it is but an attempt to have the atonement without incarnation and crucifixion.

But, you may respond by saying that even if we do turn our attention from our selves and our doubts and toward the reality of Christ, we still are not sure what to think. A phrase like "very God and very man" stirs our imagination to think of an entity composed in some strange way of man substance and God substance. Or, if we are not given to metaphysical flights of fancy, we tend to enter into psychological speculation. Which faculty or function of Jesus is God and which is man? Or, if our imagination does not lead us into metaphysics or psychology, we tend to think of "very God and very man" in terms of a kind of fairy tale.

According to Kierkegaard, the fairy tale goes something like this. A young prince was riding through his estate one day and saw a peasant girl working in his fields. He, of course, falls in love with her and desires to make her his queen. However, being not only a prince, but a noble person, he wishes to win this maiden not by his position but by himself. So, he covers his kingly purple with the rough clothes of the peasant and goes into the fields and works alongside the maiden. Everything goes as it should in fairy tales, and since the young prince is handsome and noble, the maiden soon falls in love with him.

What is interesting about this tale is that our interest is not held wondering if the prince will get the maiden, for we know he will from the start. Rather, our interest is held by wondering when the prince will rip off the rough peasant clothes and reveal the purple. Will he do it at the wedding? Or perhaps he will be revealed in trying to save the maiden from distress when in conflict the rough is torn away to reveal the purple.

That such a story has a close parallel to how we think of the incarnation is apparent. God, creator of all, finding men condemned to the drudgery of peasants in his kingdom, resolves to love and help them. He comes to help them, disguising the purple with the flesh of men, and frees them from bondage in his fields.

The problem with such a comparison, however, is that unlike the fairy tale, the picture of Christ given in the gospel does not sustain our interest in the same way.

At no time does Jesus ever rip back the veil of flesh and reveal the purple of the deity.

This mystery causes us to speculate endlessly about where the purple might be — is it in the birth story? or the miracles? or in the perfect moral life? or the resurrection? But, the Gospel makes clear that there was no purple revealed by these events because many saw all that happened and did not believe. The picture of the God-man presented in the Gospels disappoints us for it leaves ambiguous where the deity is firmly in evidence. And, this raises the hard question of how one can stake one's eternal destiny on an ambiguous figure. To do so surely seems to make one a complete fool.

We are not unique, by the way, in having this problem, for it was also clearly the problem in the scripture. When Jesus asked where men thought the purple resided, they answered by giving the current Messianic theories of the day. But, while Jesus does not deny that his ministry was the fulfillment of the hopes of Israel, he dissociates himself from such interpretations. Rather, he accepts Peter's affirmation that he is the Christ, the long expected Messiah, the one prefigured in the promise of Abraham, the purpose of the Exodus, the meaning of the Law. He accepts all this and still the purple does not show.

It does not show because he immediately charged them to tell no one saying, "The son of man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and scribes and be killed, and on the third day be raised." Now, there's the rub. What kind of redeemer is this? He was rejected by men and hung on a cross; his followers reduced to a few ignorant men who would have followed any equally good magician. One could hardly call this the showing of the purple of Israel's expectations.

God and Man Doing Divinity Humanly

The difficulty is that we have got the problem wrong at its base. All our questions and expectations presuppose that this is a man who is doing divine things. But, we look at him, and we find nothing that he did exceptional that one cannot point to in the lives of other men. History is full of men doing divine things. Nor can the divinity of Christ be merely that in his life, being flawlessly good, there was no divergence from the divine will. Were that the complete case, Jesus might have fulfilled his function by remaining a model village carpenter all his days and dying a natural death at a ripe old age.

The gospel's good news and mystery of the incarnation is not that this is the human doing the divine, but that the very human action of Jesus is divine action; it is what God does about the salvation of the world. In the common case of a good human life, humanity supplies the pattern, and God the grace. In Jesus, divine redemptive action supplies the pattern, and manhood the medium or instrument. A good man helped by grace may do human things divinely; Christ did divine things humanly.

This is the mystery of the incarnation that, unlike the prince who hid the purple under the coarse, in Christ the coarse turns out to be the purple. God is this kind of God. There is nothing to strip off to reveal God. Christ is no sham. The grace of the incarnation is in God's choice to make man at the creation, and in his election of Israel, and in his dying on the cross to be the God of humanity. This is the real mystery of the incarnation. It is not some puzzling union between God substance and man substance. Rather, it is that God is the God who chooses to have his destiny bound up with man's even to being born of women, calling disciples, suffering persecution, and dying on the cross.

But, this is just the kind of God we do not want. We want a God who through his purple is able to remove all suffering and ambiguity from our life. We want a God who through his power insures our bliss. The God of Israel and Jesus, however, is not such a God. He wills not to have men who are contented cattle but men who are able to love God as a friend and brother. Thus, God chose to be with man through his strange act of love. He decides to suffer with man so that man can be capable of being in love with God.

The meaning of the incarnation is finally that God wills to lose himself in order that man might be born. To be born is to recognize we cannot be gods but we can be men by learning to suffer in our lives in accordance with the Cross of Christ. Thus, the ambiguity of the figure of Jesus is the necessary Christological requirement to draw us into the very commitment that is necessary in order to recognize that this was surely the Christ.

Immediately after Jesus confessed his Christological being that leads to suffering and death, he says, "If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me." This is an indication that to adhere to Christ is not a matter of adhering to a doctrine called the incarnation. Rather, it is to be so involved with this kind of God that we will be willing to follow him to certain crucifixion for his sake.

I suspect the reason most of us today have trouble buying the doctrine of the incarnation is not really so much due to the intellectual problems involved. It is more likely that we are refusing to be drawn from our selves to regard the otherness of this being who asks us to become as he himself was. I do not think that such hesitation to follow Christ can be overcome by moral urgings and new layers of law. But, if we are not ready to follow Jesus, let us at least not continue to reduce Christ to the dimensions of our own spiritual life. Perhaps, if we maintain the integrity of the gospel, on the ashes of our sinful existence, some brave new generation of Christians will be born who are willing to walk such a road.

Streetscape

By GALEN GOCKEL

To understand a city, one could do worse than walk the length of Augusta Street.

It slices east-west through Chicago, laying bare a cross-section of the city, just as a knife opens a head of cabbage and reveals its substance at one glance.

There is a ghetto at each end of Augusta. The western one provides the muffled comfort of green grass lawns. The yards and the people are equally well manicured and fed. This is the new elegance of River Forest where young people come to Concordia and Rosary and study the city while avoiding it.

It is also a wealthy community which has just defeated a referendum to build a public swimming pool in the face of opposition which claimed that it would "attract undesirable nonresidents which might cause disorder."

At the other end of Augusta, nine miles east near the shore of the lake, the John Hancock building and other luxury high rise apartment buildings cast long early morning shadows.

No lawns here; no children either. These towers of steel and glass are designed to hold a professional labor force near the financial and corporate core of the city. They do so only for young adults without children or those whose grown children have already married and moved with their families to River Forest.

Between these affluent ends of Augusta Street, and perhaps because of them, are heighborhoods which suffer. The early morning shadows cast by the lakefront rises fall over Father Bilinski who stands in the window of an empty Polish National Museum and gazes out on the wide ribbon of concrete carved through the old Polish neighborhood where Milwaukee Avenue in turn crosses Chicago, Augusta, and Division Streets.

Over ground recently occupied by the homes of Polish families, the Kennedy expressway speeds air travellers in from O'Hare airport and workers to their downtown offices from the hinterland.

Age, the automobile, public neglect and the introduction of newcomers have sapped the energy and dissolved the cohesion of this once-proud neighborhood. Here, in this century, the Polish peasant arrived, eked out a bare living, learned a new language and ways, gathered his kin around him and lived out his days.

Just up the street from the museum, Sister Celene remembers the day when Holy Trinity grammar school counted 4,000 Polish-American children. She is now the principal and the school numbers 240 students. Half are black or Spanish-speaking as their families inherit a neighborhood ignored except as the site of the expressway and a public housing development.

Continuing west on Augusta, some posters in the storewindows are Polish, others Spanish. The dentists, lawyers and undertakers are Polish; the furniture stores advertise their bargains in Spanish.

Past Damen Avenue, Ukrainian children gather in the morning at the school of St. Nicholas Cathedral, an imposing, vaulted church and the keystone of a religious complex which covers almost a block.

Here the homes are neater, mostly brick two-flats with carefully planted petunias in front and canopies of elms covering the residential streets. Ukrainian is the spoken tongue, not only at the Ukrainian museum, bookstore and savings and loan, but in the shops and groceries.

The people here lead quiet lives, standing apart from the rest of the city. Yet strangers are on the doorstep; the merchants must claim Se Habla Espanol in order to survive.

Soon Augusta passes through Humboldt Park where over a hundred thousand Polish-Americans gather each May to commemorate the first European constitution safeguarding individual liberties, adopted in Poland in the 18th century.

Around Pulaski street, the city has a distinctly blue collar flavor, as Germans, Slovenians, Poles and others live in older neighborhoods, in small bungalows, above Ed's tavern, in brick four-flats. This is the area of workingmens' homes, where private tragedies are endured in ways unknown at each end of Augusta street.

At Laramie, the blacktop-and-gravel playground around John Hay public school serves as a mixer of youngsters. Here is turf to protect, since occasional black youths venture from the west side ghetto a half mile south which now extends to the western city limits.

In a few minutes, one passes from Chicago into Oak Park, at first an imperceptable change. After a few blocks the houses are much larger, the only blacks are the maids, and the only Puerto Ricans work for the landscaping services which tend the grass and prune the shrubs. Here, upper-income Catholics and Jews bicker over martinis about the nature of Christmas-Hannukah observances in the local school.

Another minute, and one reaches the western end of Augusta street in River Forest.

Thus both ends of Augusta street command the resources and attention sorely needed by those who live in the middle. Sometimes the process is dramatic, as when a neighborhood is sacrificed so expressways can connect suburbanites with their employers, the institutions which dominate Chicago and occasionally the country.

Most often, however, the process is gradual and unnoticed, which may help explain why white ethnic groups have not yet taken to the streets — save only against blacks, whom they have been convinced are their real enemies.

Get Off the Streets

By JAMES NUECHTERLEIN

It was with a distinct note of surprise, almost regret, that the television correspondent reported the other night that efforts to forcibly shut down American universities over President Nixon's resumed bombing of North Vietnam had largely failed. The significant point about the report was its accompanying assumption that the shutdown failure necessarily demonstrated widespread political apathy on the nation's campuses. It was, on reflection, an astonishing commentary on current American political culture: the absence of riot and mayhem is reported as apathy.

The fault was not simply that of the reporter. The students being interviewed seemed curiously defensive and apologetic. Rather than arguing, as they well might have, that closing down a campus by force is a silly and even indefensible response to a political issue, they instead defended their inaction. They said that the experience after Cambodia and Kent State had proved that campus riots don't work. The unspoken argument, I suppose, was that if they worked, they would be justified. This repudiation only of "unproductive" violence and not of violence itself is part of that wider and widespread body of thought that confuses street demonstrations with politics.

The idea that politics consists of confrontation in the streets comes through regularly in reports like that above from college campuses and elsewhere which remark the absence of massive demonstrations with warnings of apathy and forebodings concerning "eerie silence." The clear assumption is that if people aren't marching, or demonstrating, or – at the very least – teaching-in, they are utterly unconcerned with the great issues of our time. This notion of politics as dramatic gesture is essentially juvenile. It ignores the fact that politics, like anything else of importance, consists mainly of slow, undramatic hard work and that it doesn't have handy easy answers for every human dilemma.

The excuse most frequently heard for perpetrators of the various forms of guerilla politics is that they are thus demonstrating that they care or, more eloquently, "give a damn." It is perhaps time we addressed some healthy skepticism towards the give-a-damn school of political thought. There is, first of all, the very basic point that giving a damn will not, by itself, solve anything. More specific to our discussion here, however, is that marching in the streets, or rock-throwing, or worse is not the best, much less the only, way of expressing social concern. And this is true even if, as is common among some religiously-oriented of the activists, such actions are elevated to the status of "witnessing."

It is time for America to take politics off the streets. The relative failure of recent mass demonstrations is in fact the best news we have had for some time. The issue here is not partisan; marchers chanting "Hey, hey L.B.J., how many kids did you kill today?" and cadres drenching draft board records with blood are neither more nor less desirable than those yelling "Nigger go home" and setting fire to school buses.

The issue of violence aside – and those defending street confrontations, however non-violent their own beliefs, must accept on the record its high propensity to violence – there is every reason to urge the cooling of political passions. A society that decides it politics in the streets is not merely unstable, it isn't civilized. This is why it is so important that we maintain the distinction between the right to demonstrate and the wisdom of demonstration. An essential freedom is not necessarily an inescapable duty.

Inevitably, the politics of the street is the politics of irrationality. The kind of gross over-simplification that can portray Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon as unspeakable monsters while at the same time raising Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il Sung to the level of democratic folk heroes adds nothing of value to our political dialogue.

It is comforting to be reminded that by no means all of our young people have been deluded by the politics of mass demonstrations. My own reservations concerning the presidential candidacy of George McGovern are considerable, but I have great admiration for the large numbers of young citizens who are contributing so usefully to his campaign. Ringing doorbells, answering telephones, licking envelopes and all the rest are less dramatic than marching for great causes, but they are the real stuff of the democratic political process.

The real test for these young people will come when and if the McGovern candidacy fails. If they can accept defeat without retreating into either violent protest or fashionable despair, they will have passed a hard test of political maturity.

It has been a long time, by any reckoning, since that first great March on Washington for civil rights back in 1963. Some of us who marched then overcame our hesitation about the procedure only through our certainty concerning the cause. In the years since, the questions concerning procedure have all but disappeared, and any cause has seemed sufficient to merit taking it to the streets. Furthermore, the overwhelming concern in 1963 that violence be prevented at all costs has been sadly eroded. Many have gone to the streets too often and too thoughtlessly since then. It is time to stop.

Judaism in the Modern World

AMERICAN JUDAISM: ADVENTURE IN MODERNITY. By Jacob Neusner. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972.

In the sense that it breaks no totally new ground, *American Judaism* is just another book on the Jews in the second half of the twentieth century. It scarcely needs to be said that it has plenty of company. Most of the Jewish authors who find their way to the best seller list have wrestled with the problem before. Scores of sociologists have made their mark by contributing their insights on Jewish life in the United States. Alternatively one can turn to the professional theologians or the young Jewish radicals for their perspectives on the problem.

The problem which seems to be presumed by most of the authors is rarely mentioned. Let us make a mundane statement of it — one which most authors would be quick to disclaim. It is simply that in the last hundred years, a people who still lived intellectually and socially in the middle ages have emerged to become pre-eminent in science, politics and the arts. This meteoric ascent has been accompanied by the two greatest events in Jewish history in the last 1800 years; the Holocaust and the reestablishment of the State of Israel. Taken in this context, the assertion that there seem to be inconsistencies and contradictions in Jewish life is less than surprizing.

Judaism today very little resembles the religion of a century ago. The process of this change does not interest Neusner as much as the effect. The feature of his work that makes it worth reading is not the content as much as the methodology. The content is, more or less, a mixed bag of lengthy quotes from other sources and previously written articles. For a short work, it reads unevenly. But the methodology is ambitious. He tries to adapt the methodology of the phenomenology of religion to a consideration of the modern Jew.

It is nearly impossible to give a precise and succinct summary of the phenomenological method. As it applies to religion, it must be considered as distinct from the phenomenology of Husserl *et alia*. Husserl's original method called for bracketing or setting aside other considerations while studying a phenomenon. In the area of science, Husserl maintained that the general laws were genuine only insofar as they can be observed as applying to the phenomena which they represent. The phenomenology of religion (in much the same vein as William James' pragmatism) takes considerable license in this area. The history of religion follows two complementary though occasionally antagonistic paths in this area. The first is historical and seeks to follow a religion through its history in the search for structures. The second is "transhistorical," a word used by the phenomenologists of religion to indicate equal validity for all periods. It claims that through the collective unconscious, all mankind has a common religious heritage. This becomes clear when one compares one manifestation of the sacred against another.

In *American Judaism*, Neusner says that the problem of the phenomenological method is that it has not been applied to contemporary religions. This is a strange observation since Jurji and others have done precisely that. One suspects that Neusner is using a polite ploy to take exception to many of the phenomenological school without seeming too heretical. Neusner along with the other phenomenologists is fond of drawing contrasts between practices in Judaism today and those in so-called archaic times. For the phenomenologist of religion there exists a category of man called *homo religiosus*. He is the construct of the religious man. He does not separate myth from reality. Indeed his life is polarized around the concepts of the sacred and the profane. As one examines man's religious history, examples of this abound. If a phenomenologist of religion is of the Eliade school, he tends to see clusters of symbols which indicate hierophanies or kratophanies — manifestations of the sacred or of sacred power. These are defined only by way of contradistinction; that is from one another — not by any definition which may be self-limiting.

While the phenomenologists of religion warn us not to compare their method to the antecedent method of Husserl, the temptation is irresistible. In his method, one either analyses his own thought or that of another person. The notion of working with diverse systems is foreign. A lengthy quote from one phenomenologist of religion (C. J. Blecker, *The Sacred Bridge*, Leiden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1963, p. 3.) shows the difficulties which arise:

> [The phenomenology of religion]. . . comprises two principles, namely the epoche and the eidetic vision. The first principle means the suspension of judgment. In using the epoche one puts ones self into the position of the listener, who does not judge according to preconceived notions. Applied to the phenomenology of religion, this means that this science cannot concern itself with the question of the truth of religion. Phenomenology must begin by accepting as proper objects of study all phenomena which profess to be religious. Subsequently the attempt may come to distinguish what is genuinely religious from what is spurious. The second principle, that of the eidetic vision, can be easily understood. It has as its aim the search of the eidos, that is the essentials of religious phenomena.

Put bluntly, if there is a difference between judging the truth value of a religion and separating the genuine from the spurious, it escapes me. How does one simultaneously take a believer seriously and yet judge his religion to be more or less than he professes? Moreover since the phenomenologist of religion has not eschewed the self-authentication of his perception of the sacred, how is one to argue with him except on equally intuitionalist grounds? Still it is possible to do just that with reference to Judaism.

How seriously should the notion of the sacred in the lives of the forefathers be taken? To be sure, men of faith such as existed in the middle ages (and for Jews that approaches this century) are rare today. But are we justified in saying that secular man is a totally new development? Have we (1) submerged the sacred in our consciousness or (2) eliminated it from our consciousness in which case we would have no point of departure or (3) devaluated it in favor of other pre-existing tendencies?

Secular Man in Archaic Times

If religion is to make sense in terms of today's realities, we have to explore the third alternative. Can we find evidence of secular man in archaic times? If so we perhaps have a greater bridge between the generations than the phenomenologists would grant us. On one level it might be baldly said that the whole notion of *homo religiosus* is in a very real sense the product of a romantic mind. Just as the glories of Greece and Rome extolled in 19th century England did not correspond to those often inelegant and often grotesque societies -- so also the 40 years in the desert was hardly the honeymoon of God and Israel as the prophets would have us believe. Similarly, apostasy, freethinking and syncretistic tendencies are nothing new to Judaism. The word *apikuris* (epicurean) after all is a talmudic expression for a whole category of thought which has been excised from rabbinic literature. Men in the time of the first commonwealth whose names come down to us with the appendage "bosheth" are clearly the remnants of the baal cults.

But to narrow the topic — where does one see evidence of secular man in Jewish history? It is not necessary to look in the direction of Job or Jonah; they were struggling with a presupposed deity in an existential battle. But examples abound. We read in I Samel 2-3 of the interplay of the secular corruption of the sons of Eli and the young prophet Sam-

uel. The reader is left with the impression that the eclipse of the open vision of God (I Samuel 3:1) was a result of the priests having forgotten the holy dimension of their work. It could be Buber speaking. Not unlike the organization men of no ecclesiastical bent whatever that Neusner sees pervading Judaism today, these men transvalued the sacred into the profane. What about the unthinking syncretism which invades religion? Consider the reign of Solomon. What of the temporizing political Jew of no theological bent at all? One need only look with less sympathy than is traditional at Queen Esther. As for the claim that men instinctively tend toward the hierophanic expressions, the prophets tell us that they do not always.

All this Neusner sees too. He is thoroughly conversant with Jewish history, yet he places little emphasis on this secularity in earliest history. Furthermore, man for most ages, not merely archaic man, lived in a world of awe and wonder which the phenomenologists consider the sign of religion. Understanding religion under this sign, modern man must either be only subliminally aware of his religiosity or he must be non-religious.

Neusner however sees a third possibility here. That is that the ancient forms continue to transmit their cultural, ethical and theological message without the awe which phenomenologists took for an essential component — and consequently relegated Judaism to a second-rate religion because of it. Modern Judaism represents a challenge to such phenomenology. Judaism continues to be more than a vestigial lingering of an ancient doctrine. Indeed many of its manifestations are revitalized.

To be sure, Neusner knows the weak aspects of life among American Jewry. The life of *mitzvah* — of personally sanctifying each aspect of a person's life by prayer, ritual, and acts of benevolence — has become an institutional function in the United States, many times removed from the individual. Observance of *mitzvah* has become equated with membership in a Jewish organization. This has allowed the development of supraorganizations in Jewish life whose aims and actions the individual is only dimly aware of — and there is reason to believe that these aims and actions do not in many cases correspond to the conscious orientation of the member.

To be sure, the organizations have made some Jewish identification in this institutional age relatively painless. They have furnished Jews with social influence and prestige quite without precedent. Yet it must be seriously asked how the individual's life is enhanced by them.

Those who move the organizations are often no more observant of the life of *mitzvah* than the individual Jews they represent. One can scarcely contemplate a new organization whose name would approximate the old *Chevra Kaddisha* (holy society). The secular bureaucrat in Jewish life, while often competent, rarely feels himself to be part of the ideology which he is charged to promote. The rabbi today stands as a tortured figure. He knows the integrity of *mitzvah*, but his life is balkanized among the spheres of community leadership, pastoral psychology, teaching, the priestly mantle, and perhaps vestigial scholarship. But among the hierarchy of the organizational leadership in Judaism, he enjoys less real power all the time. More often than not, he is maintained out of hollow respect for his title rather than for his function.

As if to echo Will Herberg's sentiments, Neusner speaks of the now well-known fractionalizing of Jewish life in the last century and a half which has given sense to the previously foolish question: "What is a Jew?" At one time a culture replete with music, language, literature, cuisine, and a communal life — all radiating from a deeply religious core — gave few occasions when such a question could arise without an obvious answer. The question today is a complex one for Jew and non-Jew alike. The paths of looking for essences or existential interpretations have served to emphasize the fragmentation rather than create a new synthesis. Neusner quotes (p. 64) Daniel Bell on this point:

> For the Jew, his relation to the past is complicated by the fact that he must come to terms not only with culture and history but religion as well. For the religious tradition has shaped the others providing both the conscience and the continuity of fate. As an agnostic, one can, in rejecting religion, reject God; one may reject a supernatural or even a transcendental God. But as a Jew, how can one reject the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob — without rejecting oneself? How then does a modern Jew continue to identify with Jewish fate? And if such an identification is made and conditioned largely by a generational experience, at that, what must the consequences be? The initial problem remains a religious one.

This reviewer concurs with this view. The problem for the American Jew is (1) to accept faith to a greater degree than is common today and be orthodox, (2) to be totally rationalist and immerse oneself in ethics, and (3) to be chronically dissatisfied with Judaism's lack of spiritual soaring.

Ultimately, many Jews are forced back to a combination of (1) belief in the history of the Jewish commitment and (2) the credo that absurdity is all that is left (a la Tertullian). The combination makes Zionism viable and meaningful. However, mainstream Judaism has difficulty accepting as its content the polarity of faith and reason.

For Neusner, the fact that Jews so estranged from archaic times still find that the tradition speaks to them in clear tones is baffling. For if archaic man did indeed exist, he is correct that Judaism is a paradox of two nearly different entities each calling itself Judaism. I would however deny that archaic man ever existed. Rather what we have witnessed is a radical changing in the balance in the Jewish consciousness. The difficulty in approaching modern Judiasm lies in the method, not the subject — as any good scientist ought to know.

ALAN GORR

The Consolidations of Philosophy

PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY. Four volumes. Edited by Julius R. Weinberg and Keith E. Yandell. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971

Holt, Rinehart and Winston have released a four-volume paperback series designed to introduce beginning students to some topics in traditional and contemporary philosophical inquiry. Teachers of philosophy should find the series helpful in organizing some types of courses on the topics covered. Teachers outside philosophy who have interdisciplinary tastes will find the volumes agreeable. Students will find the format familiar and serviceable for getting into the field. Most ordinary adult readers, I think, will find the issues discussed in these volumes too specialized for easy general perusing, although Yandell's sprightly commentary may well have succeeded in producing quite readable volumes for those generally educated readers who might crave exposure to the sort of topics contemporary philosophers are talking about.

The four volumes consist principally of primary readings — stitched together with appropriate prefaces and connective commentary — centering on various issues within four traditional areas of philosophical inquiry: ***Theory of Knowledge*** (Vol. I), ***Metaphysics*** (Vol. II), ***Ethics*** (Vol. III), and ***Philosophy of Religion*** (Vol. IV).

The recent success of series-publications (see below for information on other series) in the philosophy textbook market accounts for the appearance of this, yet another addition to the spate of paperback series with which it will now compete.

For the college philosophy textbook-market, publication in the series-style is now in full-flower. There is no end to variation of organizational principles sufficient to generate publications in this genre for quite some time to come. Each series can fairly claim some advantage of theme, scope, and pedagogy not

possessed by other series. Each series gives greater flexibility, choice of emphasis, method of instruction, and rate of progress to educators. From the standpoint of availability of different types of materials keyed to specific educational needs, these are exciting times to be engaged in teaching and learning. There is much to choose from. Holt, Rinehart and Winston's new series will find its rightful place within the family of philosophical teaching materials available in increasing variety from commercial presses plying the thick paperback-waters of the university textbook world.

Personally, I am inclined to think Professor Yandell's and the late Professor Weinberg's volumes quite good for their type, although I have not used any of the volumes for my university courses and cannot say how they would sell themselves to students. The organizing-principle of the volumes, in the editors' words, was ". . .our desire. . .to gather a representative collection of essays, each complete in itself, which would provide the beginning student with a fair sampling of the problems, solutions, and techniques of argument and appraisal with which philosophers have been concerned for more than two millennia. The essays are arranged into sections, each deals with one central issue, most are arranged so that an essay presents a solution to a problem and is then criticized by the essay or essays that follow. The introductions trace the thread of one argument through the essays they introduce, and thus make no pretence of raising all the issues that the essays themselves raise."

These volumes get high-points by virtue of overall balance. The prefaces and commentary are comprehensive without being pedantic. Editors' critiques and summaries are both succinctly and clearly formulated, though sometimes overly compressed for my tastes. The selections themselves are meaty without being overly-long. The issues under a single theme are agreeably diverse without losing some sense of unity. The sources are both traditional and contemporary. The style of the four volumes is lean, young, crisp. Basic bibliographical materials are included. I think the series should hold its own very nicely in the field. It will offer to interested readers a balanced and probing introduction to many of the philosophical issues currently under discussion, particularly if read in conjunction with some of the kindred volumes contained within other publishers' series.

In taking proper note of Holt, Rinehart, Winston's contribution to this field, the reader should not overlook other extant materials of the same type. Some time ago Mentor Books published its now popular six-volume series organized along historical lines: *The Age of Belief* (the Mediaeval philosophers), edited by Freemantle; *The Age of Adventure* (the Renaissance philosophers), edited by de Santillana; *The Age of Reason* (17th century), edited by Hampshire; *The Age of Enlightenment* (18th century), edited by Berlin; *The Age of Ideology* (19th century), edited by Aiken; and *The Age of Analysis* (20th century), edited by White.

More recently, the Free Press launched a competing nine-volume series under the general editorship of Paul Edwards and Richard Popkin — "Readings in the History of Philosophy" — designed, when completed, to span the main periods of Western philosophy.

More commonly, series of this type are topically, rather than historically organized. Individual volumes will contain readings addressing a common theme, problem, or area, while there will be no common theme binding together the entire series save for a common publisher, format, cover-design and principle of organization.

For example, Harper is issuing a still incompleted series under the general editorship of Frank Tillman — "Sources in Contemporary Philosophy" — which includes the following volumes: *Free Will and Determinism*, edited by Berofsky; *Philosophical Analysis and History*, edited by Dray; *Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Hampshire; *Essays in Perception*, edited by Ayer; *Aesthetics*, edited by Hospers; *Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Smart; *Epistemology*, edited by Stroll; and *Ethics*, edited by Thompson and Dworkin.

Prentice-Hall is publishing a series edited by Joel Feinberg and Wesley Salmon — "Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy" — which includes the following titles thus far: *Minds and Machines*, edited by Anderson; *Ordinary Language*, edited by Chappell; *God and Evil*, edited by Pike; *Truth*, edited by Pitcher; and *Creativity in the Arts*, edited by Tomas.

The stress in those series is on currency of sources, which is also true of two other series that should be mentioned. Under the general editorship of Lewis W. Beck, Macmillan is releasing a series entitled "Sources in Philosophy" which includes, thus far, the following titles: *Metaphysics*, edited by Baylis; *Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences*, edited by Braybrooke; *Philosophy of History*, edited by Donagan and Donagan; *Philosophy of Education*, edited by Frankena; *Political Philosophy*, edited by Gewirth; *What is Philosophy?*, edited by Johnstone; *Ethics*, edited by Mothersill; *Philosophical Problems of Natural Science*, edited by Shapere; *Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Smith; *Aesthetics*, edited by Stolnitz; and *Theory of Knowledge*, edited by Yolton.

Oxford University Press, under the general editorship of G.J. Warnock, is gradually releasing a series entitled simply "Oxford Readings in Philosophy," which currently includes the following volumes: *Theories of Ethics*, edited by Foot; *Knowledge and Belief*, edited by Griffiths; *The Philosophy of Science*, edited by Nidditch; *Political Philosophy*, edited by Quinton; *Philosophical Logic*, edited by Strawson; *The Philosophy of Perception*, edited by Warnock; and *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by White.

Finally, some publishers are commissioning a series of monographs written individually by a single author but published as items in a series which together attempt to span the principal problem-areas under current discussion. Noteworthy in this field is Prentice-Hall's completed series — "Foundations of Philosophy" — edited by Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley.

KENNETH KLEIN

Worth Noting

H. L. MENCKEN: ICONOCLAST FROM BALTIMORE. By Douglas Stenerson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. $7.95.

This book has the structure of a doctoral dissertation. Its "Preface" states its author's problem, which is to make "an intensive study of his [Mencken's] temperament, his famed 'prejudices,' and his career in journalism." The final chapter, entitled "Conclusions," is a sort of *quod erat demonstrandum*. Even the 43 pages of notes look like part of a dissertation.

But the structure is deceptive, for there is nothing dry-as-dust about the book. As a matter of fact, its live and witty style will delight the hearts of all Mencken buffs.

The first chapter, entitled "Mencken and *The American Mercury*, 1924-1926," presents a portrait of the mature iconoclast (he was born in 1880) at the height of his career. It is an excellent portrait of the man, but it fails to give the reader any idea of the tremendous popularity of Mencken's *Mercury* among the young men and women of the time who considered themselves intellectuals. This reviewer vividly recalls being in the drug store across from the campus of the University of Iowa one day in the mid-twenties when two hundred copies of the latest issue of the *Mercury* were delivered to the magazine stand.

Having completed the portrait, Mr. Stenerson proceeds to the study of the origin and development of Mencken's ideas, attitudes, and style. The ideas and attitudes can be accounted for in large part, the author thinks, by the following circumstances: Mencken spent his boyhood in Baltimore, a city that was half Old-South and half New-South in tradition; he spent it in a German-American sub-culture of that city; he spent it in a prosperous middle-class family; he spent it in a family whose adult members were nominally Lutherans, but actually skeptics. All these circumstances, Mr. Stenerson thinks, help account for the opposition to the genteel, puritan, New England tradition in American culture "which is one of the main themes of his [Mencken's] mature writings."

What set Mencken apart from most of his

middle-class contemporaries, Mr. Stenerson believes, was his "sharing in the literary movement of the nineties," which he saw "as part of the broad trend loosely associated with Darwinism." He then gradually became a devoted propagandist for the ideas of Darwin, Nietzsche, and Shaw.

When World War I began, Mencken frankly supported Germany and had great fun sniping at Woodrow Wilson. The period during which America participated in the war was therefore a difficult time for him. *The American Language*, which he published in 1919, reinforced, Mr. Stenerson believes, "his efforts to create an American as opposed to an Anglo-Saxon culture." That sounds a little farfetched.

When World War I was over and the literary rebellion that had started in the nineties had run its course, Mr. Stenerson says, Mencken became the "mentor of a disillusioned generation." For the remainder of his active years, that is, until he was disabled by a stroke, he continued to fascinate the public with his style. He had, however, always been fundamentally conservative in politics and economics, and his comments on such things as the depression, mass unemployment and social unrest began to sound old-fashioned. His public therefore gradually rejected him as mentor.

The two aspects of Mencken's work which Mr. Stenerson considers most durable are "his libertarianism — his affirmation of the right to dissent — and the gusto and artistry with which he expresses it."

WALTER G. FRIEDRICH

Music

The Musical Collector

By WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

One of the delights of my musical prowlings in England this month has been the discovery of H. Balfour Gardiner.

You are doubtless on your way to your reference books to find his listing. When you find it, there will be little said of him. Yet to English musicians of the period before World War I (a wonderful period it must have been) Gardiner was a generous friend. Classmate of Quilter, champion of Holst, and confidante of Delius, Gardiner was responsible for a series of concerts in the pre-war years presenting new music to London audiences. That his own music figured little in those concerts apparently speaks for the unselfishness and modesty of the man — and his keen self-critical powers.

He wrote not much, though at least one piece, "Shepherd's Fennel Dance," achieved great popularity at the Promenade Concerts. None of the sources has much to say definitively critical about his music unless "attractive and very English" are to be taken as perjorations. He left off composition and professional life after the war, retired on his private income to a farm in the south, and concerned himself alternately with his friends in music in the city and his livestock and fields in the country.

From his early life we have his lovely "Evening Hymn," the only piece of church music Gardiner wrote. The style is not fashionable today, but its day of revived popularity in this fickle world of musical novelty will come again. Meanwhile, discerning choirs keep it in their repertoire as a "period piece" of exquisite craftsmanship.

The text is the Latin hymn, "Te Lucis ante Terminum," the song of evening devotions for many centuries. Gardiner's setting places the familiar words in an atmosphere of calm reflection rather than attempting to interpret them. No text-painting, no symbols. The musical structure supports the literary structure while following a logic quite independent of the latter.

The design of "Evening Hymn" is more simple than conventional: organ introduction, first stanza sung by four-voice choir with organ, organ interlude, second stanza sung unaccompanied, organ interlude, third stanza with organ, and a coda on "Amen." Stanzas one and three have the same melody; stanza two is in the relative minor. The sense of recapitulation after development is intended. What makes this hymn the gem it is? The harmony and counterpoint.

The opening twenty-two measures unfold over a tonic pedal point. The first clear cadence is at the end of stanza one. That same cadence closes the third stanza, and the tonic is again held for twenty-two measures while the choral and upper organ parts unwind in the coda to the single pedal note that was heard at the outset.

The melodies are mostly simple diatonic lines shaped carefully in phrases that are clear but not obvious. Chromaticism is reserved to the various chords of the seventh on the sharped fourth degree. G-sharp diminished seventh to D-minor tonic is the characteristic progression of the piece. The middle stanza is a lovely bit of musical ambiguity. Sing each line separately and at least three keys are suggested. The minor cadence is arrived at only at the last moment. The reharmonized return of the melody at stanza three is a thrilling surprise. It points the more emphatically to the closing cadence.

The analysis, of course, is not a substitute for the experience, but I modestly hope I have tempted you, gentle reader, toward the experience. (A recording by the choir of Peterborough Cathedral is sold under the Abbey label.) In Gardiner's "Evening Hymn" intention and means are governed impeccably by imagination and taste. Such achievement suggests that his music and that of his circle bear further hearing.

One can collect fine — but little known — music as one collects antiques. But one can also collect the same music against the day of its rediscovery as a "new" old song. Listen again to the music your grandparents preferred. Perhaps as many musical treasures lie behind us as lie ahead.

James Halvorson, graduating art major, *Planter with Rope*, ceramic vessel, 1972. Sloan Honorable Mention Award.

Candace Keller, junior art major, *Tennis Shoe*, ceramic sculpture, 1972. Sloan Studio Achievement Award.



Lauri Gates, freshman art major, *Head*, pencil drawing, 1972.

Visual Arts Exhibition: Current Work by Student Artists, Valparaiso University

Mercedes Carino, graduating art major, *The Family*, oil painting, 1972. Sloan Purchase Award.



James Halverson, *Double-Winged Noobie*, 1972. Welded steel construction.

Michael Scherb, junior art major, *Cookbook Cover*, graphic design, 1972.



Maurice Killey, graduating art major, *Prototype for Your Contemplation*, laminated wood, 1972. Union Purchase Award.



By RICHARD H. W. BRAUER



Betty James, sophomore art major, *Textural Bingo*, game design, 1972. Sloan Honorable Mention Award.

"Man, Good, Bad, and Indifferent"

By WALTER SORELL

To be attracted by something that is not ours is perhaps a basic human quality. As a New Yorker I am in love with London if for no other reason — and there are many more — than its theatre. It is probably the ease with which one can go to the theatre more or less on the spur of the moment, the superb acting one sees, the choice of new plays and revivals that makes theatre-going such a pleasure. And there is one more thing that has always struck me about London: a tradition-bound ambience about everything pertaining to the theatre. **This love of tradition is exactly what we haven't got.**

I first chose to see *Alpha Beta* by E. A. Whitehead because his first play, *The Foursome,* was so impressive. *Alpha Beta* is a two-character play dramatizing a marriage going sour and more intolerable from act to act. But so, in a way, is the play. The characters and the situation are well conceived, but the theme is thin.

Despite the lower middle-class Liverpool dialect the language is that of intellectuals. The growing bitterness between the husband and wife is not dramatically strong enough to make the larger and dubious point that marriage itself is inherently dehumanizing. What, however, somewhat saves the play is the acting skill of Albert Finney and Rachel Roberts who pull off a triangle story with the third person always present but never on stage.

The triangle story will never die as long as men and women remain as human as they are. *Notes on a Love Affair* by Frank Marcus is a highly sophisticated version of it. Frank Marcus can write well and, when writing from a writer's viewpoint, he is excellent. He chose Robert Frost's line "You don't take notes during a love affair" for his play's motto and has his novelist-herione, **played by Irene Worth, take notes.**

She plots a love affair between her former husband and a young dental hygienist, as if they were the leading characters of her next novel. And they are. She types chapters while the action proceeds, but we also see her discover the sadness of her real life when its emptiness begins to show through her little game with the lives of others. In contrast to the bravery of the young girl who becomes pregnant in the course of the engineered affair, the novelist's callousness is chilling.

When I was young in the 20's I saw many anti-militaristic plays, such as *Journey's End, The Good Soldier Schweik,* or *Hoppla We Live.* These plays came as a delayed reaction to World War I. Far more delayed is the reaction now of a few young German dramatists to Germany's war-madness of thirty years ago. Harald Mueller's *Big Wolf,* produced by the Royal Court Theatre and staged by William Gaskill, is far more terrifying than anything written after World War I.

Big Wolf shows one year in the lives of five teenagers orphaned by war. With Germanic thoroughness and Teutonic ruthlessness we are shown how these youngsters struggle homelessly for survival in a battle-scarred world. Surrounded by fighting and dying soldiers, they form their own military unit — The Wolves — and ape the discipline and madness of the grown-ups. Their war-cry is the howl of wolves, and their pack is a miniature of the brutalized world of man. There is some comic relief — if you can laugh about a boy without legs forced to do pushups — but the Grand Guignolesque style often turns *Big Wolf* into excruciating melodrama.

The most impressive play now on the London boards is Tom Stoppard's *Jumpers.* It is an allegory on "Man, good, bad, and indifferent" according to the playbill. The play is a fantasy on a professorial lecture with magnificent theatrical interruptions. "To ask *if* God exists is to presuppose the pre-existence of a God who may not exist," Michael Hordern, playing the professor, dictates to his secretary at the beginning of the play. He personifies the most acid parody of the academic in love with his own staggering banalities.

The title refers to a group of university professors who practice gymnastics, but the play itself cannot be summed up in a neat turn. Try to imagine the professor continuing to dictate his lecture on God, the goodness of man, and a philosophical analysis of a sandwich. Now add the secretary doing a striptease on a swing, the professor's wife singing pop songs, a murder of one of the jumpers, the nervous breakdown of the wife when even British astronauts are incapable of preserving the poetic myths about the moon, a vice-chancellor doing quack psychiatry on her, a bumbling Scotland Yard inspector tossed in for good measure, an agnostic professor elected Archbishop of Canterbury, a few more fired shots, and a mock trial almost danced as a ballet for the **grand finale. Got it?**

Sounds like a farce, right? Actually, it's a very talky play, delivered rapidly with wit, satire, and undoubtable deeper meaning — if we can just find out what it is. Maybe the play is too clever and too allegorical, too **subtle and too brilliant for its own good.** But it is unusual, fascinating, and great entertainment. It was staged at the National Theatre by the Old Vic with breathtaking bravura. If theatre is make-believe, then this play and production made me believe in the theatre again.

Editor-At-Large

By JOHN STRIETELMEIER



Father of the Groom

If, on the morning of the tenth of this month, you should be one of the scores of tourists who daily visit Valparaiso University's Chapel of the Resurrection, you may catch a glimpse of a portly, middle-aged gentleman lurking about the premises with his hair slicked back and his legs encased in sponge bag trousers. On closer inspection you may note that the portly gentleman bears a striking, although time-ravaged, likeness to the Editor-at-Large, whose confirmation picture appears each month at the head of this column. But you will be seeing him in a new and unaccustomed role, that of Father of the Groom.

Next to the Vice-Presidency of the United States, there is probably no more totally ceremonial a role than that of Father of the Groom. There have even been, I am told, instances where the Father of the Groom failed to receive notification of the time and place of the wedding and was thus left wondering when, if ever, he was supposed to wear the funny clothes which he had been told to rent. And so it may happen that the Father of the Groom is the only one more or less immediately involved in the wedding madness who has the time or the perspective for musing about what happens in those few moments of relative quiet when the clergyman asks his "Wilt thous" and a young man and young woman, knowing little really about what they are doing, answer all too confidently, "I will."

I keep reading about how marriage, as an institution, has had it. Just last week, I was reading in one of the slick magazines that marriage is for squares, that no one with the will or the capacity to grow would really want to "forsake all others and hold me only unto thee so long as we both shall live." And there is, of course, a considerable grain of truth in that statement, as any long and happily married man or woman would be the first to testify. The person who has the capacity to give himself or herself completely and lovingly to husband or wife probably has the capacity for what young people are calling "meaningful relationships" with scores of attractive people whom he encounters in the course of a lifetime. But one of the many delights of marriage is to feel this capacity growing and maturing, at the same time it works itself into a constantly sharper focus on that one person who is most willing and most able to respond to it.

No doubt many marriages fail to grow beyond an initial impetus of lust or infatuation. Our fathers might have counseled that such marriages should be borne with resignation. I am not so sure that we are not wiser to terminate them before they wither and choke both of the spirits involved in them. And I sometimes suspect that our nation's high divorce rate is itself the best testimony to the worth of marriage as an institution. If there were not so great a hope of happiness in marriage, we might be less inclined to terminate the unhappy marriage and try again. But for the millions of us who have been spared the tragedy of divorce, what does marriage mean in this last third of the Twentieth Century?

I suppose that all of us would have some particular answer to that question, reflecting largely the experiences of his own marriage. For me the answer is simple: Freedom. The very gift which modern hedonism promises to those who reject the institution of marriage is to be found in its purest form, I am convinced, only within the intimacy of that social, spiritual, intellectual, sexual, emotional, and recreational institution which is marriage. Implicit in our nature, I believe, is the need to belong: to God (because we are creatures), and to a man or woman (because we are sexual creatures). And until we give ourselves consciously and willingly to that to which we rightly belong, we cannot be truly free.

But marriage, like most good things, needs time to develop its potential. The present fad for liaisons which last only so long as both parties find them meaningful is a way of avoiding most of the pain of especially those early days of marriage when, as Chesterton put it, two stubborn pieces of iron are in the process of being fused together. But by comparison with the marriage which has survived earthquake, storm, and fire, these liaisons are pretty bland things. Ultimately the best argument for monogamy is that it takes a whole lifetime to master the fine art of husbandhood or wifehood. This is the secret that most of our popular literature and all of our advertising are designed to conceal, and the result is that people are disillusioned and embittered to find that they have not attained, by the age of thirty, a kind of married joy and happiness which probably is not possible before forty or fifty.

Incidentally, there is one very delightful privilege which the Father of the Groom enjoys. He gets to take the Mother of the Groom home after the reception.

The Pilgrim

By O. P. KRETZMANN

"All the trumpets sounded for him on the other side."
PILGRIM'S PROGRESS

Qui Tollis

A June evening out of the tropics, hot and breathless . . . The elms are still and the haze over the valley shimmers with heat. . . Lazy shadows make the campus a study in grey and green. . . Inside a building some students and I are listening to one of the great musical authorities in America. . . The subject of the lecture is the *Mass in B Minor*. . .

"A strange mixture of great, good, and bad music," the learned lecturer says. . . "Never intended for performance as a part of divine worship". . . "Seven themes directly appropriated from other sources". . . "Almost every imaginable style of composition". . . "Sometimes so crowded with notes that it cannot possibly be performed well". . .

He arrives at the choral section "Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi". . . "This," he says, "is beyond description". . . "The greatest choral music ever written, matchless clarity, amazing profundity, marvelous solemnity". . . "Here Bach was at home". . .

The visiting lecturer placed the recording on the machine and the music filled the room. . . "Qui Tollis" . . . "Thou Who Bearest". . . The words and the notes soared through the open windows and flew upward into the night sky. . . The stars would not hear them, but the stars do not need them. . . They were intended for me and all men, who need them if we want to understand life and live. . .

In the words and music of the "Qui Tollis" is both the realness of our sin and the greater realness of its transfer from the world to Him who bore our sin in His body on the tree. . . The melody itself conveys the steady, strong, lifting and rising action which is the meaning of the text. . . For some music one feels the urge to stand up; here at the "Qui Tollis" one has the desire to kneel before the mystery of God and to let Him raise us up to the likeness of his Son. . .

The recording and the lecture ended and the shadows on the campus merged into the general darkness of the night. . . The end of another sun in the summer of the year of our Lord. . . Now the cool of the evening after the heat of the day. . . In the remembered echoes of the "Qui Tollis" I reflected upon the days to come. . . As the students gathered up their lecture notes and scattered into the night, I hoped they had also heard the deep call of one world to another in the "Qui Tollis" and taken it home. . . A call for amphibious men and women, at home in two worlds, holders of dual citizenship, living by the lifting power of the Bearer of our sins, living eternal life in the midst of time. . .

"Agnus Dei, Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi". . . So often sung on Good Friday — but words and music for every day. . . I remembered a special Good Friday service announced many years ago. . . It was a service offered in the middle of the day and workers were urged to come "as they are" in working garb. . . "As they are" . . . There is something in that. . . Too often the Church is hopelessly removed from the stream of daily life. . . It is good for us to dress up on a Sunday morning and appear before the Lord with scrubbed faces and in our best suits. . . It is equally good and perhaps better that at times we come to church "as we are". . .

The Church which sings the "Qui Tollis" can and should be part of the warp and woof of the world, close to it, squarely in the middle. . . The best divine service, I believe, would be one to which the men and women would come from their work as the vesper bell rings. . . The center aisle would be lined with empty lunch pails . . . If there should be an usher in a frock coat with a carnation in his lapel, I hope he would stumble over the pails. . . The preacher would say a few words fitting for the end of the day and for the day ahead, and everybody would sing an evening hymn. . . God, I am sure, would like that very much. . .

"Qui Tollis". . . I am finally reminded of those words of scripture which have seldom been explained properly: "The common people heard him gladly". . . Some of the prophets spoke in words of majesty and mystery, but not our Lord. . . The Bearer of the sins of the world was close to life and His speech was simple and clear. . . With Him we are not on the brow of Mount Sinai in thunder and lightning nor in the shaking and smoking temple with flying seraphim, but on a hillside under the afternoon sun, listening to a friend. . .

He talked of grass and wind and rain
Of fig trees and fair weather.
He made it His delight to bring
Heaven and earth together.
He spoke of lilies, vines and corn,
The sparrow and the raven;
And words so natural, yet so wise,
Were on men's hearts engraven;
And yeast and bread and flax and cloth
And eggs and fish and candles —
See how the whole familiar world
He most divinely handles!